home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
-
-
- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- RIVERS v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the sixth circuit
- No. 92-938. Argued October 13, 1993-Decided April 26, 1994
-
- Petitioners filed a complaint under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C. 1981,
- alleging that respondent, their employer, had fired them on base-
- less charges because of their race and because they had insisted
- on the same procedural protections in disciplinary proceedings that
- were afforded white employees. Before the trial, this Court issued
- Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 171, holding
- that 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination in the mak-
- ing and enforcement of contracts does not apply to conduct which
- occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not inter-
- fere with the right to enforce established contract obligations. The
- District Court relied on Patterson in dismissing petitioners' dis-
- criminatory discharge claims. While their appeal was pending, the
- Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) became law, 101 of
- which defines 1981's ``make and enforce contracts'' phrase to
- embrace all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship,
- including discriminatory contract terminations. The Court of
- Appeals ruled, among other things, that 1981 as interpreted in
- Patterson, not as amended by 101, governed the case.
- Held: Section 101 does not apply to a case that arose before it was
- enacted. Pp. 4-15.
- (a) Landgraf v. USI Film Products, ante, p. ___, in which this
- Court concluded that 102 of the 1991 Act does not apply to cases
- arising before its enactment, requires rejection of two of petition-
- ers' submissions in this case: their negative implication argument
- based on 402(a), 109(c), and 402(b), see ante, at ___, and their
- argument that Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696,
- controls here, rather than the presumption against statutory
- retroactivity, see ante, at ___. Pp. 4-5.
- (b) The fact that 101 was enacted in response to Patterson
- does not supply sufficient evidence of a clear congressional intent
- to overcome the presumption against statutory retroactivity. Even
- assuming that 101 reflects disapproval of Patterson's 1981
- interpretation, and that most legislators believed that the case was
- incorrectly decided and represented a departure from the previous-
- ly prevailing understanding of 1981's reach, the Act's text does
- not support petitioners' argument that 101 was intended to
- ``restore'' that prior understanding as to cases arising before the
- Act's passage. In contrast to the 1990 civil rights bill that was
- vetoed by the President, the 1991 Act neither declares its intent to
- ``restor[e]'' protections that were limited by Patterson and other
- decisions nor provides that its 1981 amendment applies to all
- proceedings ``pending on or commenced after'' the date Patterson
- was decided, but describes its function as ``expanding'' the scope of
- relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protec-
- tion to discrimination victims. Taken by itself, the fact that 101
- is framed as a gloss on 1981's original ``make and enforce con-
- tracts'' language does not demonstrate an intent to apply the new
- definition to past acts. Altering statutory definitions, or adding
- new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of
- amending statutes, and simply does not answer the retroactivity
- question. The 1991 Act's legislative history does not bridge the
- textual gap, since the statements that most strongly support
- retroactivity are found in the debates on the 1990 bill, and the
- statements relating specifically to 101 are conflicting and unreli-
- able. Pp. 5-10.
- (c) Contrary to petitioners' argument, this Court's decisions do
- not espouse a ``presumption'' in favor of the retroactive application
- of restorative statutes even in the absence of clear congressional
- intent. Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187, and Freeborn v. Smith, 2
- Wall. 160, distinguished. A restorative purpose may be relevant to
- whether Congress specifically intended a new statute to govern
- past conduct, but an intent to act retroactively in such cases must
- be based on clear evidence and may not be presumed. Since
- neither 101 nor the statute of which it is a part contains such
- evidence, and since the section creates substantive liabilities that
- had no legal existence before the 1991 Act was passed, 101 does
- not apply to preenactment conduct. Rather, Patterson provides the
- authoritative interpretation of the phrase ``make and enforce
- contracts'' in 1981 before the 1991 amendment went into effect.
- Pp. 10-15.
- 973 F. 2d 490, affirmed and remanded.
- Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
- quist, C. J., and O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
- Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
- Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting
- opinion.
-